Michigan Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 4

1941

INTERSTATE COMMERCE - MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935 POWER OF STATES TO REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS AS TO
SIZES AND WEIGHT
Spencer E. lrons
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, State and Local Government
Law Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Spencer E. lrons, INTERSTATE COMMERCE - MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935 - POWER OF STATES TO
REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS AS TO SIZES AND WEIGHT, 39 MICH. L. REV. 631 (1941).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/9

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENTS

INTERSTATE CoMMERCE - MoToR CARRIER AcT oF 1935 PowER OF STATES TO REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS AS To S1zEs
AND WEIGHT - The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 1 provides, in section
204 (a) (1) and (2), that the Interstate Commerce Commission, in
performing its duty of regulating interstate motor carriers, shall have

1 49 Stat. L. 546 (1935), 49 U.S. C. (Supp. 1940), § 304 (a) (1) and (2).
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power to "establish reasonable requirements with respect to ... safety
of operation and equipment." In section 225, the act authorizes the
commission "to investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation of the sizes and weight of motor vehicles. . . ." 2 These two sections, when read together, indicate that Congress felt that sizes and
weight regulations deserved consideration apart from general safety
regulations. 3 The former are closely related to the preservation of the
highways over which the regulated vehicles travel, and since each state
has its own individual problems of highway construction and maintenance, questions have arisen as to the proper scope of a state's power
to control the stress which is to be placed upon its roads.4 The purpose
of this comment is to determine first, the meaning of section 22 5 as a
limitation on the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction, and,
secondly, the permissible area of state legislation in prescribing weight
and size limitations.
2 49 Stat. L. 566 (1935), 49 U.S. C. (Supp. 1940), § 325. Under this section,
by orders dated November 8, 1937 and August 28, 1940, in Ex Parte No. MC-15,
an investigation was instituted by the commission and a series of five reports was
issued, entitled: Report No. 1, State Limitations of Sizes and Weights of Motor
Vehicles; Report No. 2, Road Facilities and Vehicles Used in Highway Transport;
Report No. 3, Sizes and Weights of Motor Vehicles in Relation to Highway Safety;
Report No. 4, Bridge and Road Facilities in Relation to Vehicle Characteristics; and
Report No. 5, Legal Aspects of Federal Regulation of the Sizes and Weight of Motor
Vehicles.
3 "The report submitted to the Seventy-third Congress, Second Session {Senate
Document No. 152-[1933]), by the Coordinator of Transportation, 'urged uniform
regulation of motor vehicles so as to prevent serious interference with the free flow
of interstate commerce.' The action recommended, however, distinguished between
various types of state regulations. 'Upon analysis, it [was] found that the requirements
as to gross weights, lengths, and widths of vehicles are often grounded in State policies
with respect to the design of highways' (p. 3 2). Since 'questions of highway design
and highway costs are highly technical,' the coordinator recommended that this subject, together with the results of an investigation of working conditions in the industry,
be reserved for consideration in future reports. [p. 3 2.] The recommended Federal
motor carrier bill, accordingly, drew a distinction between matters concerned with
safety of operation and equipment and those connected with sizes and weights of
vehicles, and working conditions in the industry.'' Reidy, "Car Over Cab Case," 7
I. C. C. PRAcT. J. 471 at 475-476 (1940).
4 Sizes of motor vehicles are restricted by the laws of all states except Nevada,
and by the District of Columbia, and gross weights are restricted in some manner by
every state. These restrictions are generally found in laws which relate principally to
highway regulation rather than vehicle regulation. Weight regulations prescribe one
or more of four factors: (a) gross weight, (b) weight per axle, (c) weight per wheel,
and (d) weight per inch of tire width. These factors are used in various formulas, by
means of which the regulations can be adjusted to prevent all of the types of stress
which pavements and bridges have to withstand. See Report No. 1, State Limitations of
Sizes and Weights of Motor Vehicles, Ex Parte No. MC-15 (1940). See also comment,
36 MICH. L. REV. 450 (1938).
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I.
5

In 1936 and r93J6 federal district courts refused to enjoin the
enforcement of state statutes regulating the weight of interstate trucks
on the ground that the Motor Carrier Act had not superseded this
regulatory power of the states. In one of these cases, Barnwell Bros. v.
South Carolina Highway Dept.,7 the court very specifically said, as to
sizes and weight regulation:
"The presumption is hardly to be indulged that Congress intended to include size and weight in 'safety of operation and
equipment' or 'standards of equipment,' as to which the Commission was given full power of regulation, when by section 2,125
... size and weight were specifically dealt with and the Commission was authorized merely to investigate as to these and report
on the need of regulation."
This case upheld a South Carolina statute which regulated size as
well as weight of interstate vehicles. The statute was held valid even
though it limited width of vehicles to ninety inches, and thereby imposed a considerable burden upon most interstate carriers whose vehicles
had been built to conform to the more liberal limitation of ninety-six
inches imposed by almost all other states. 8
More recently, in the case of Maurer v. Hamilton,9 arising under
a Pennsylvania statute,1° the problem received thorough consideration
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The statute provided in
section rn33 (c), "No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways
5

L & L Freight Lines v. Railroad Commission of Florida, (D. C. Fla. 1936) 17
F. Supp. 13. In denying the injunction against the state weight statute, the court said,
"Primarily • . • size and weight is a problem of road stress-a problem which may
vary widely in different states, as well as in different parts of the same state, depending
upon the construction and age of roads. In the latter aspect the problem is therefore
one P,.rimarily local in nature, which no doubt explains why Congress withheld regulation in that respect until the Commission 'investigates and reports.'" 17 F. Supp. at 15.
6
Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes, (D. C. Ill. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 425. This case
presents a good analysis of the weight regulation problems with respect to highway
construction and maintenance. Barnwell Bros. v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.,
(D. C. S. C. 1937) 17 F. Supp. 803.
1Id. at 807. See comment in 36 M1cH. L. REv. 443 (1938).
8
The question whether the Motor Carrier Act had superseded state power to
regulate sizes and weight was not argued on the appeal of this case to the Supreme
Court, although the lower court had held that the Motor Carrier Act had not superseded state laws. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S.
177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938).
9
309 U. S. 598, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940), a.ffg. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa.
17, 17 A. {2d) 466 (1939). The decisions in the Supreme Court were unanimous in
both the Barnwell case and the Maurer case, and the opinion in each case was written
by Justice Stone.
10
Vehicle Code of 1929, § 1033, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1939), § 642.
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of this Commonwealth carrying any other vehicle, any part of which
is above the cab of the carrier vehicle or over the head of the operator
of such carrier vehicle." 11 Maurer and Myers Auto Convoy, using
equipment which came under the terms of the statute, :filed a bill to
restrain its enforcement by Pennsylvania officials. It was claimed that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause had been violated, and that the power of the states to
regulate in this manner had been superseded by the Motor Carrier
Act, section 204 (a) (1). The latter claim, however, was the main
point argued, since it has been settled that the states have power to
make this kind of regulation in the absence of federal statute.12 The
state trial court found as a fact that the location of motor vehicles over
the cab of the carrier vehicle rendered its operation dangerous on the
curves and grades of the Pennsylvania highways,18 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained this finding. Both state courts upheld
the statute as a safety regulation pertaining to the size and weight of
vehicles using the highways.
The United 'States Supreme Court, on appeal, reasoned that since
section 22 5 had reserved to the states the power to regulate sizes and
11 After the argument of the appeal in this case, but before the decision in the
state supreme court, this section was amended to read: "(c) No person shall operate a
vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth carrying any other vehicle the weight
of which is directly above the cab of the carrier vehicle or directly over the head of
the operator of such carrier vehicle." Act No. 400 of June 27, 1939, Laws (1939)
II35 at !ISO, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, Supp. 1940), § 642 (c). "The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, considered this amendment and concluded that the
statute both before and after the amendment applied to the vehicles used by appellants
and was directed at the same evils, and that no essential change was made by the
amendment." Footnote to the Court's opinion, Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598
at 600, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940). This construction was also adopted by the United
States Supreme Court.
12
See Kauper, "State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers," 3 1 M1cH. L.
REv. 920, 1097 (1933). Although the states cannot regulate interstate motor carriers
in order to promote an orderly economic development of the motor transport industry,
they can go far in prescribing rules for the operation and equipment of interstate
motor transport lines in order to promote public health and safety, and to protect the
highways.
13
The trial court found that the location of the carried car above the driver raises
'the center of gravity of the loaded car above that which is normal in trucking operations, places excessive weight on the front axles and tires, obscures the vision of the
driver of the carrier car, with the results that it increases the difficulty of steering the
loaded car, adversely affects braking, particularly on curves, and affects the balance of
the loaded car so as to make its use on the highways dangerous. It also found that in
case of collision or loss of control the overhead car has a tendency to fly off the cab, in
consequence of which, in numerous cases, serious injury had resulted to the operator
of the truck or to the colliding car and its occupants or both, and that the height of
the overhead car and its interference with the driver's vision causes him to drive on
the wrong side of the road in order to avoid overhead obstructions.
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weight,14 and since these regulations include regulations of vehicles
and their loads, the Pennsylvania statute was within the area reserved
to the states.15 Thus the statute was held to be a regulation of "sizes
and weight" within the meaning of section 225, rather than a regulation of "safety of operation and equipment" within the meaning of
section 204 (a) ( r). The Court said,
"A construction of the reservation made in § 225 is not to be
favored which would deprive the states of authority to make safety
regulations of sizes and weight before Congress was informed by
a full investigation and report of the Commission of the nature
of the regulations, both those in force and those which are needed,
and whether in the light of the competing demands for national
uniformity and for accommodation to local conditions, regulation
of sizes and weight can be best prescribed by the Commission, by
the state legislatures, or by a divided authority. . . . Sizes and
weights which affect safety, not excluding considerations of local
conditions, as well as those which affect wear and tear of the highways were to be the subject of investigation, and it is the subject
of investigation which defines the reservation from the Commission's authority to regulate." 16
This surprisingly broad construction of section 225 was adopted
by the Court on the ground that the states retained control over the
safety aspect of sizes and weight as well as control over the mere
physical dimensions of vehicles. Of course the fact that there is no
exact dividing line between regulations of sizes and weight and safety
regulations of operation and equipment causes much of the trouble
encountered in applying the act. But, considering the purpose of section 225, the sole criterion as to whether a statute is within the states'
power should be whether it is needed to preserve the states' highways.
The Pennsylvania statute does not meet this test, however, since
Pennsylvania laws contain, in addition to the law in question, a complete vehicle code which provides for comprehensive weight and size
restriction. 11
14

Cf. note 8, supra.
The Court dismissed as unimportant a report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, entitled In re Car Over Cab Operations, 12 M. C. C. 127 (1939), in which
the commission stated that there was no unusual danger involved in the use of vehicles
such as were covered by the Pennsylvania statute. In addition, the commission stated,
"The safety regulations heretofore prescribed by us, of course, apply to these as well
as other vehicles operated by common and contract carriers in interstate or foreign
commerce. The operations of vehicles so equipped are therefore permitted by the
existing regulations and there is no need for change." Id. at 133.
16
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 at 615, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940). For a
report of the case containing a more complete statement than is found in the Court's
opinion, see Reidy, "Car Over Cab Case," 7 I. C. C. PRAcT. J. 471 (1940).
17
Vehicle Code of 1929, §§ 902, 903, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1939), §§ 452,
453.
15
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The Interstate Commerce Commission, in regulating safety of
operation and equipment,18 had regarded the load of a vehicle as within
its dominion, and had provided by revised version of its regulations,
effective January r, 1940, certain rules applicable to loading: 19
"The load on every motor vehicle transporting property shall
be properly distributed, and if necessary, secured, in order to
prevent unsafe shifting of the load or unsafe operation of the
vehicle.
"No motor vehicle shall be driven unless the driver thereof
shall have satisfied himself that the tailboard or tailgate, tarpaulins, spare tires, and all means of fastening the load are securely in place.
,
"No motor vehicle shall be so loaded as to obscure the driver's
view ahead, or to the right and left sides, or to interfere with the
free movement of his arms or legs, or to prevent his ready access
to the accessories required for emergencies."
These regulations were regarded as exclusive, and the commission's
report on In re Car Over Cab Operations 20 had definitely held that
they were adequate to cover car over cab operations. However, the
Supreme Court disregarded these interpretations, and said that "In
ordinary speech the load of a vehicle is not spoken of as a part of its
equipment." 21 The commission had taken the position that no state
regulation concerning the safety of vehicles subject to the act was
either necessary or desirable, since it would create needless diversity
and conflict, and impose the very burdens upon interstate commerce
that the Motor Carrier Act was designed to prevent. The Court disregarded this policy argument, however, and upheld the control asserted by Pennsylvania.
The Maurer decision, in extending the scope of state regulatory
power under the sizes and weight provisions of section 225, will lead
to unnecessary confusion, as similar decisions have done in the past.
In 1925 the decision in Buck v. Kuykendall,22 holding invalid a state's
economic regulation of interstate motor carriers, did not stop state
regulatory statutes. The states merely changed the avowed purpose
18 The commission's regulations governing the equipment of motor vehicles specify
the number, character and location of headlamps, tail-lamps, clearance lamps, side
marker lamps, brakes, safety glass, windshield wiper, rear-vision mirror, horn, fuel
intake pipe, gasoline tank, couplers for trailers, fire extinguisher, red lantern, red flag,
tire chains, flares, fuses, first-aid kit, hand ax, etc. Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 1
M. C. C. 1 (1936).
19 I. C. C. Rules and Regulations (1940), § 2.091 to 2.093, published CCH
FEDERAL CARRIER SERVICE,§ 3125a (1940), and 4 FEDERAL REGISTER 2298 (1939).
20 12 M. C. C. 127 (1939). See note 16, supra.
21 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 at 612, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940).
22 267 U. S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324 (1925).
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of their statutes and based regulations on preservation of the highways.23 When the Barnwell decision was announced in r938, holding
that the severe South Carolina statute 24 was not a burden on interstate
commerce, it was predicted that the states would proceed with further
restrictive legislation. 25 The Pennsylvania statute bears out this prediction. Following the Maurer decision, then, other states may be expected to adopt a similar course, on the basis of the expanded meaning
given to size and weight regulations. 26 There is an additional unfortunate circumstance attending the present situation which did not exist
in the confusion following Buck v. Kuykendall. This is the question
whether in the expanded area reserved to the states by section 225, the
federal government has any constitutional power to exercise jurisdiction and thereby interfere with a state's control over its own instrumentalities. 21 Thus there is danger that the lack of uniformity may be
permanent and not merely temporary. 28
2.

Within the area of state control of motor vehicle regulation, the
states have promoted many schemes which have had no relation to the
protection of the highways. A Texas statute limiting the net load and
the length of vehicles provides for an exception from these restrictions
in favor of vehicles going to or from the nearest practicable common
carrier loading point; 29 Wisconsin has a provision favoring certain
vehicles in the dairy industry; 30 and Alabama makes a weight exception
for certain refrigerator vehicles. 31 It may take more than a few such
23 See Kauper, "Federal Regulation of Motor Carriers," 33 MICH. L. REv.
at 7, 239 (1934).
24 The South Carolina statute has since been changed so as to conform to the
usual standard of 96 inches. S. C. Code (1938 Supp.), § 1617, art. III (28). § 1617
repeals § 1617 of the 1932 Code and 1934 Supplement.
25 See note, 36 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1938), commenting on South Carolina
State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938).
26 West Virginia has passed a statute almost identical to the Pennsylvania statute.
W. Va. Acts (1939), c. 88.
21 See Kauper, "Federal Regulation of Motor Carriers," 33 MICH. L. REV. 1,
239 at 241 ff. (1934).
28
Ten years elapsed between the decision in Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307,
45 S. Ct. 324 (1925), and the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. This was
a mere temporary lack of uniformity!
29 2 Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925), art. 827a, §§ 2-5. This exception obviously
favors the railroads.
30
Wis. Stat. (1939), §§ 85.45 to 85.48; §§ 85.53 to 85.66; § 85.47 (1) [as
amended by Laws (1939), c. 71]; § 85.53 (1) (b) [as amended by Laws (1939),
c. 190].
81
Ala. Gen. Acts, (Extra Sess. 1932), No. 58, §§ 3, 6, IO, and §§ 4, 5, 7, as
amended in Acts (1939), No. 484.
I
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exceptions to cause any appreciable stress on pavements, but allowing
any exception to weight provisions is contrary to the general policy of
such regulations. 82 The designing of highways and the regulation of
vehicle weight should be so correlated as to strike a balance between
what is reasonably demanded by highway users and what the state taxpayers can afford. 83 The value of a uniform and well-considered plan
of regulation is obviously destroyed by exceptions. However, even
though the exceptions in these statutes are clearly not primarily designed to protect the highways, despite what they so carefully recite
on their faces, the Supreme Court has had little difficulty in sustaining
them. In Sproles v. Binford,84 the Court considered the apparently
discriminatory provision of the Texas Penal Code, referred to above.
The law limited to 7,000 pounds the load which a vehicle could carry,
and limited to thirty-five feet the length of a single vehicle, but provided as an exception that a greater length and a greater load should
be permitted in the case of a vehicle "used only to transport property
from point of origin to the nearest practicable common carrier receiving or loading point or from a common carrier unloading point by way
of the shortest practicable route to destination." 85
The Court recognized that the railroads were being favored at the
expense of the motor carriers, but sustained the law as a valid exercise
of the state's police power. Shifting a portion of the transportation
business from the roads to the rails was thus held to be a reasonable
means of protecting the highways.
"The use of highways for truck transportation has its manifest convenience, but we perceive no constitutional ground for denying to
the State the right to foster a fair distribution of traffic to the end
that all necessary facilities should be maintained and that the
public should not be inconvenienced by. inordinate uses of its highways for purposes of gain." 86
82 Weight provisions in most states contain almost no exceptions or exemptions.
Report No. 1, State Limitations of Sizes and Weights of Motor Vehicles, Ex Parte No.
MC-15, p. 78 (1940).
88 Princeton University, in March, l 940, completed a survey of the financing of
New Jersey's 17,000 miles of improved roads and streets. One of the results of this
survey shows that 95% of the vehicles on the highways can be adequately served by
the thinnest pavement. To build a road for the heaviest 1.7% of the traffic requires a
road which costs l 7. l % more than a road which does not have to accommodate these
vehicles. 7 I. C. C. PRACT. J. 341-342 (1940). See also Report No. 4, Bridge and
Road Facilities in Relation to Vehicle Characteristics, Ex Parte No. MC-15, p. 47
(1940); and 36 M1cH. L. REv. 443 (1938).
84 286 U.S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581 (1932).
85 2 Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925), § 5 (b). See note 29, supra.
86 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 at 394, 52 S. Ct. 581 (1932).
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This case thus justified a partial economic regulation of the state's transportation system in the name of protection of the highways.
Also indicative of the Court's leniency in judging legislation of
this kind was its decision in Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, 31 where it allowed the state commission to exclude interstate
trucks from operating over one particular state route in order to prevent undue and dangerous congestion of traffic. This was upheld even
though it appeared that the commission's report was based solely upon a
study of highway conditions along two and one-half miles of road
within the city limits of Fremont, Ohio.
In these cases the Court has indicated that it would uphold state
legislation upon the slightest showing that the legislature had made
any study of the situation. There was, then, some precedent for holding, in the Maurer case, that the Pennsylvania statute violated neither
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the commerce clause. It is surprising, however, in view of
the discriminatory character of the Pennsylvania restriction, that the
Court did not inquire more thoroughly into the legislative context of
the statute. Article IX of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code 88 provides
for regulation of sizes and weight of vehicles and loads. Then in addition, in article X, under a subhead, "miscellaneous regulations," appears
the statute in question. 39 There is, accordingly, a general law for all
vehicles, and then a special law concerning motor haulaways, the provisions of which have no necessary relation to the sizes or weight of the
37

289 U. S. 92, 53 S. Ct. 577 (1933).
Vehicle Code of 1929, art. IX, §§ 901-907, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1939),
§§ 451-457.
89 Vehicle Code of 1929, art. X, as amended, § 1033, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon,
1939), § 642: "(a) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth having two levels for the carriage of other vehicles.
"(b) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth
carrying other vehicles, any part of which is carried at a heighth of more than one
hundred and fifteen ( II 5) inches above the ground.
"(c) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth
carrying any other vehicle, any part of which is above the cab of the carrier vehicle or
over the head of the operator of such carrier vehicle.
"(d) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth
carrying any other vehicle, any axle of which is more than three (3) feet higher than
any other axle on such carried vehicle." Subsection (c) is the only provision involved in
the appeal of the Maurer case.
The statute, if enforced in its entirety, would effectively prohibit the carrying
of new cars by motor carrier through Pennsylvania, since these provisions require that
cars be carried all on one level, and the statutes of neighboring states have limitations
on the length of vehicles, which prevent the carrying of an economically practicable
number of cars on one level. An amendment of June 27, 1939, P. L. II35 at II8o,
§ 29, 75 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, Supp. 1940), § 642, provides that (a), (b) and (d) shall
not become effective until January I, 1942.
88
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vehicles regulated. Under these circumstances it would not have been
improper to look behind the expressed purpose of the statute and find
that in reality it was designed to favor transportation of automobiles
by railroads at the expense of motor carrier competition.4°
Spencer E. lrons
40 A court is empowered to hold a statute unconstitutional if there is no reasonable
relation between the ends sought and the means used. For an analysis of how far the
Supreme Court has followed this doctrine, see Bikle, "Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 HARV.

L. REv. 6 (1924).

